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SC 07740/60

13 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Status of Guided Missiles Task Force Research

This memorandum transmits a summary report of the research activities of the Guided Missiles Task Force during its first six months of operation. The attached report also presents an appraisal of the current status and outlook for this activity so that you and other senior officials of the Agency may have our views concerning the prospects for solution of the long-range missile problem. The fact that we have not achieved and cannot yet anticipate major breakthroughs has further increased our sense of urgency in seeking solutions to this critical problem.

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Chief, Guided Missiles Task Force, DD/I

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STATUS OF GUIDED MISSILES TASK FORCE RESEARCH
OCTOBER 1960

Research Objectives

During its first six months, the Task Force has undertaken a program of research which has as its principal objectives: (1) the allocation of adequate personnel resources and their integration into an effective research team on the problems of production and deployment of long-range ballistic missiles; (2) a more intensive focusing of the research effort on the substantive areas most likely to yield definite results; (3) assurance that all available evidence is being thoroughly and systematically exploited; and (4) development of new approaches to both research and collection problems.

Reports Produced

The Task Force has made the major community contributions to two comprehensive assessments by CMAIC of missile production and deployment facilities and has published a number of other reports, some of which were previously in process in ORR.

1. CMAIC Reports on ICBM Production and Deployment Facilities

The production study, prepared primarily by the Task Force, supplemented an earlier summary CMAIC report on ICBM production. The supplementary report evaluated all available information on every production facility which any member of the intelligence community nominated as a possible ballistic missile producer. The deployment study up-dated and extended an earlier study by reviewing new evidence on suspect locations specifically covered in the earlier report, and assessing in detail the data on a number of additional locations. It was not possible to identify conclusively either an ICBM production facility or an operational long-range missile site, nor was new evidence developed to indicate the current pace and magnitude of Soviet missile programs. On the other hand, these studies have continuing value because they drew upon the information holdings of the entire community and have provided for the first time a common data base for further research and analysis.

2. Coverage of Priority Deployment Areas

One of the most controversial problems connected with NIE 11-8-60 is whether the intelligence community's lack of

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evidence of ICBM deployment signifies the absence of a substantial Soviet program or merely reflects Western inability to detect the program with current collection means. On the basis of research done by the Geographic Research Area of OSR and PIC, the Task Force prepared a survey of coverage of the most likely ICBM deployment areas of the USSR by all photographic and observational collection media. This study concluded that the coverage had been inadequate to insure that even a sizeable Soviet program in its early stages would necessarily have been detected.

3. Khrushchev's Statements

An analysis has been published of the meaning of Khrushchev's statements on the production status of the Soviet ICBM in terms of the normal usage in Soviet industry of the terminology he employed.

4. Management of Missile Production

A report has been completed tentatively identifying an organization which may play a major role in the industrial management of the Soviet missile program.

5. Collection Guidance Material

The Task Force has distributed a target study and collection guide on one of the few identified ballistic missile production facilities, as well as a comprehensive, two-volume handbook on missile intelligence for the guidance of field collection personnel throughout the world.

6. NIE 11-8-60

The Task Force provided extensive support to the Board of National Estimates in the preparation of NIE 11-8-60.

Reports in Process

The Task Force has under way reports covering a wide range of approaches to the missile problem, including a number which employ new or intensified research techniques. Several of these reports are nearing completion and will be published in the next few months.

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1. Deployment Site Studies

These studies deal with the most highly suspect locations of operational missile sites in the USSR. For each location all available information bearing directly or indirectly on the likelihood of missile deployment will be presented and assessed, and the most definite possible conclusion will be drawn. These studies will be more detailed and thorough than the presentation contained in the GMAIC deployment reports discussed above; however, the evidence may not support a positive identification in any case.

2. Moscow Prototype Production Facilities

A similarly detailed analysis of the major ballistic missile prototype production centers in the Moscow area is in the first draft stage. Although unlikely to provide direct evidence of the current pace and magnitude of Soviet long-range missile programs, this study is expected to improve our understanding of the nature and timing of the early stages of each of these missile systems.

3. Deployment Concepts

An effort is being made to deduce in detail the most likely configuration and method of operation of deployed Soviet ICBM and IRBM sites, using knowledge of the test ranges, probable missile characteristics, U.S. analogy, and an expected contribution from STL. Although there are serious data limitations and a large number of variables involved in this problem, these projects may yield conclusions which are sufficiently firm to assist in both the collection and analysis phases of the site identification effort.

4. Integrated Weapons System Analyses

By viewing each of the Soviet long-range missile programs as a whole, from development through operational deployment, as well as the interrelationships between programs, it may be possible to narrow the range of community estimates on the status of the programs. As a minimum, this research should establish the internal consistency of our estimated programs and indicate in some detail what activity must have taken place in each program to achieve the various estimated levels of operational capability.

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5. Production Methodology

In order to exploit rapidly future information which identifies one or more ICBM serial production facilities, the Task Force, with assistance from SFL, is developing a methodology for estimating the production capacity of a final assembly plant, and for determining the effect on capacity of the more important variables.

6. Exploitation of Photographic Materials

In addition to priority exploitation of available photographic materials on all specific target locations and a general search for direct indicators of missile activity, the Task Force is providing guidance to PIC for a systematic cataloging and analysis of facilities in priority deployment areas for which no function has been identified. The purpose of this project is to eliminate as many of these installations as possible from further consideration as missile facilities and to determine whether there is any pattern or other indication that the remaining installations could be operational missile sites.

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7. Machine Processing

The Task Force has acquired sizeable data holdings in two specialized fields:

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[REDACTED] and (b) information on Soviet orders of technical books and journals from the West, which may yield the identity of Soviet organizations participating in the missile program. Because of the volume and complexity of this material, machine data processing methods will probably be required for full exploitation. The Task Force is working with a representative of the DE/I Automation Staff to develop a program for machine exploitation of the book order material and has made arrangements with the Staff for expert assistance in developing a similar program for the airflight data as soon as the necessary additional material is received from NSA.

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Appraisal

1. The formation of the Task Force has effectively separated the problem of the production and deployment of Soviet long-range missiles from less urgent research and has allocated adequate personnel resources to this priority problem. Moreover, it has improved liaison and coordination with other community components.

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2. As a result, the research now under way in the Task Force will provide a greater assurance that no significant current evidence or method of exploitation has been overlooked.

3. However, the quality and quantity of information now available and currently being received continues to be inadequate to meet U.S. national security requirements because it provides no direct basis for estimating the pace and magnitude of Soviet long-range missile programs.

4. The most critical immediate need is to identify and determine the physical characteristics of an operational ICBM site. This would facilitate the search for additional sites by both collectors and analysts. It would also provide a basis for estimating the complexity and effort involved in the deployment program and an indication of the pace and size of the program.

5. Despite data limitations, the research of the Task Force is clearly advancing our knowledge of a number of specific aspects of Soviet long-range missile programs.

6. Current Task Force research is improving our ability to exploit new information as it is received.

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